














  The Maastricht convergence criteria are partially based on the theory of 
optimum currency areas and costs-benefits analysis of the creation of a single 
currency area as the EMU foundation. 
  Fulfillment of convergence criteria should be durable, but it requires a certain 
degree of real convergence between member countries of the monetary union. 
  The analysis of the economic role of the convergence criteria which has been 
carried out in this paper indicates that its implementation has been an important 
factor of macroeconomic stabilization for the EMU countries as well as for the 
countries planning accession to the Union. 
  On the basis of the theory of economics and results of empirical studies we 
cannot state univocally that the convergence criteria are a barrier to economic 
growth. 
Naturally, this problem is controversial, but we can formulate a hypothesis that 
implementation of convergence criteria is an important factor of macroeconomic 
stabilization and sustainable economic growth. 
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Introduction 
 
The convergence criteria established by the Maastricht Treaty, obligatory for both full 
members of the European and Monetary Union (EMU) and member countries with a 
derogation, have been arising controversies among economists and economic 
politicians alike and in particular the criterion of fiscal stabilization. What gives rise to 
controversies is, first of all,  the criteria’s relative arbitrariness but also theoretical and 
practical (political) approach to such issues as: the role and goals of the state in 
economy, the question of macroeconomic stabilization and economic growth, the 
issue of exogenity and endogenity of the criteria of the optimum currency area. This 
paper is an attempt to answer to the question whether the convergence criteria 
adopted in the European and Monetary Union are the stabilizing factors or a barrier 
to the economic growth and whether their stabilizing influence is ineffective from the 
point of view of the theory of economics and theses of economic policy. 
 
1.  Nominal and real convergence in the theory of monetary union 
 
There is no uniform theory of monetary union. It is composed, however, of theoretical 
approaches which are, to a large extent, complementary to one another but with 
reference to some issues they treat the processes of monetary integration in a 
completely different way. This section of the paper deals with the theory of optimum 
currency areas, cost and benefit analysis as well as hypothesis of endogeneity of the 
criteria of the optimum currency area. Each of these concepts and, in particular, the 
classical theory of optimum currency areas and the hypothesis of endogeneity of 
criteria of the optimum currency area were criticized which, however, does not 
diminish their essential explicatory and cognitive valours. 
 
In our further discussion, the monetary union shall be understood as a single 
currency area of uniform monetary policy implemented by a supranational central 
bank. The monetary union can be a source of significant benefits for the countries 
implementing it. These benefits are connected with the disappearance of the costs of 
currency exchange, disappearance of the exchange related risk in economic 
relationships between countries creating the union, price and employment 
stabilization and growth of real GDP.
2 
 
On the other hand, the countries forming the monetary union resign from monetary 
policies of their own (including currency exchange) as the instruments of 
macroeconomic stabilization. Thus, restoring economic equilibrium in the case of 
economic shocks can be based on the market mechanism of adjustments and, to 
some extent, on using the fiscal policy. The latter is not a very efficient or a refined 
instrument of macroeconomic stabilization and besides in the long and medium run it 
leads to increased budget deficit, public debt and higher interest rates.
3 
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The theory of optimum currency areas points to the criteria which the economies of 
the countries creating the monetary union should meet. Meeting these criteria is 
considered indispensable to create the optimum currency area characterized by 
efficient functioning of adjustment mechanisms restoring economic equilibrium in 
particular countries and in the whole union as a currency area. 
 
Such criteria include: high labour and capital mobility, both geographically and 
among sectors, openness of economies, diversification of production and flexibility of 
markets, prices and wages.
4 What is more, it is pointed out and explained that the 
countries creating the monetary union should be characterized by a similar level of 
economic development, similar economic structures and similar tendency to inflation 
and similarity of inflation rates, convergent levels of budget deficit and public debt in 
relation to GDP and similar legal system.
5 Also, the significance of the degree of 




On the basis of the theory of optimum currency areas it can be concluded that the 
countries which differ much among one another with reference to the level of 
economic growth and mechanism of economy functioning should undergo the 
process of real convergence. The real convergence means here a process of deep 
structural and institutional changes in economy leading to convergence of integrating 
economies with reference to the level of economic development and mechanism of 
their functioning, the course of economic cycles and also convergence of the criteria 
of the optimum currency area. 
 
J.A. Frankel and A. K. Rose are of a different opinion. They formulated the 
hypothesis of endogeneity of the optimum currency area criteria. According to them, 
historical data do not determine whether a country is a good candidate for the 
monetary union. Creation of a single-currency area (monetary union) releases 
mechanisms aiming at its optimization, i.e. achieving convergence of economies after 
some time, which would ensure their balancing and minimization of stabilization 
losses. Openness of economy plays the main role among the optimum currency area 
criteria. A high degree of openness of economies and facilitation of mutual trade by 
introduction of single currency leads to higher integration in the sphere of trade and, 
first of all, to more intensive intra-industry trade. Whereas the development of inter-
industry trade based on comparative advantages favours differentiation of economic 
cycle among countries because economies are more sensitive to idiosyncratic 
shocks, specific for developed production branches, the development of intra-industry 
trade and its domination in mutual trade will lead to the increase in correlation   
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between economic cycles. This, in turn, is a factor leading to convergence of 
economic cycles. A high degree of integration in the field of trade (first of all, through 
the development of intra-industry trade) in the case of countries of relatively 
synchronized economic cycles should lead to transformation of idiosyncratic 
economic shocks (i.e. specific for a given economy) into the economic cycle 
coordinated on the international scale.
7 
 
However, it seems that even if we accepted the hypothesis about endogenity of the 
optimum currency area criteria, the process of real convergence is, to some extent, 
indispensable, if the union is to be created by countries of different level of economic 
development. The very authors of this hypothesis emphasize that countries can be 
divided into those which are good candidates for the monetary union and those which 
should continue with autonomous monetary policy. They  treat the level of 
synchronization of economic cycles as a criterion of this division The countries of a 
lower level of the economic cycle synchronization with that specific for the countries 
of the created monetary union should use national monetary policies in order to 
stabilize economies. 
 
Besides, deep structural and institutional changes are indispensable in the case 
when the economies of the countries planning to create the monetary union or join 
the existing one are characterized by relatively rigid markets, prices and wages, a 
relatively high inflation rate, and high budget deficit and public debt.  The burden of 
adjustments in the case of economic shocks within the framework of the monetary 
union or in the case of individual member countries (asymmetric shocks) will rely 
mainly on the market mechanism. Thus, the above mentioned reforms should create 
conditions for efficient functioning of market adjustment mechanisms. Hence it is 
necessary to create institutional and structural conditions for flexible markets, prices 
and wages and reduce the level of market disturbances caused by fiscal policy and a 
negative influence of the excessive budget deficit and public debt. 
 
2.  Convergence criteria – their origins and significance 
 
The idea of the convergence criteria (nominal convergence) adopted in the European 
and Monetary Union is, to some extent, a consequence of the postulates resulting 
from the theory of optimum currency areas. 
 
Nominal convergence is expressed in attainment of specific macroeconomic indexes, 
close to the required ones, as the condition of joining the Economic and Monetary 
Union. Real convergence means durable structural adjustment of economy to the 
economies of the Union, which results in meeting convergence criteria and 
maintaining them which also means long-term macroeconomic stabilization. Thus, it 
is not only the effect of using the monetary and fiscal policies in order to achieve a 
short-term goal in the field of budget deficit, inflation and public debt. 
 
There is a relationship between real convergence and durable maintaining of nominal 
convergence criteria. 
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The real convergence processes should lead to macroeconomic stabilization and 
sustainable fulfillment of the nominal convergence criteria. 
 
The nominal convergence criteria which must be met by the countries joining the 
Economic and Monetary  Union were laid down in the European Union Treaty which 
is also known as the Maastricht Treaty.
8 They include: price stabilization criteria, 
fiscal stabilization criterion, criterion of long-term interest rates and stabilization of the 
national currency exchange rate within the framework of the European Rate 
Mechanism II (ERM-II). Moreover, the criterion of fiscal stabilization was defined in 
the 1997 Stabilization and Growth Pact  together with the sanctions for not fulfilling it 
by the member countries of the EMU and member countries with a derogation.
9 
 
The first criterion specifies the maximum inflation rate which cannot exceed the 
average inflation rate typical of three EU member countries of the lowest inflation by 
more than 1.5 percentage points. 
 
The fiscal policy criterion provides that the top value of the budget deficit to GDP ratio 
cannot be higher than 3% and the public debt cannot exceed 60% of GDP. 
 
The level of the long-term interest rate (interest on long-term bonds) in a given 
country cannot exceed by more than 2 p.p. the average percentage interest rate  in 3 
EU countries of the lowest inflation. 
 
Last but not least,  the country which is a candidate for the Economic and Monetary 
Union must introduce its currency to the ERM II. This means concluding an 
appropriate  agreement with the Central Bank which puts the candidate country 
under the obligation to ensure full convertibility of the currency, making the central 
currency rate rigid in relation to the Euro and its stabilization within the fluctuation 
margin +/- in the period of at least 2 years without implementing devaluation. 
 
The price stability criterion was adopted for several reasons. Firstly, it was feared (it 
was Germany which feared most) that in the future the Economic and Monetary 
Union would be inclined to inflation. Germany particularly insisted on adopting this 
criterion  with the view of making the Union’s future monetary policy analogous to that 
of the Bundesbank. In this way, the countries of low inflation wanted to protect 
themselves against the Union’s central bank’s policy, which could be based on 
preferences represented by the countries of high inflation. Moreover, it was assumed 
that the convergent low inflation rates in the Union countries would promote 
economic growth by  decreasing uncertainty in economic activities. Convergence of 
inflation rates and maintaining them at a low level was also to limit the risk of social 
conflicts destabilizing economic life. 
 
The fiscal stabilization criterion was based on similar premises as the price stability 
criterion. In the past, majority of countries joining the Economic and Monetary Union 
                                                 
8 See: Treaty on European Union – Final Act, 1992, europa.eu.int/abc/obj./treaties/en.entoco1.html; The Euro: 
explanatory notes by Directoriate General II – Economic and Financial Affairs, Euro Papers, Number 17, 
February 1998. 
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Union and the European Council. General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, January 1999, pp. 
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had structural problems with budget deficits. Growth of budget deficits and public 
debt leads to the crowding-out effect of private expenditures on consumption and 
investment, which limits the long-run possibilities of economic growth. It is also the 
reason for maintaining high tax burden for population and enterprises. This, in turn, 
has an adverse effect on economy’s effectiveness and international competitiveness. 
Undoubtedly, the introduction of this criterion contributed to acceleration of reforms of 
public finances in individual countries.
10 On the other hand, it should be borne in 
mind that introduction of reference values in the form of a 3% share of budget deficit 
in GDP and the public debt share in GDP of up to 60% is arbitrary and is not justified 
by the theory of economics and economic practice. As P. De Grauwe puts it, these 
values result from a simple equation:
11 
      d = g x b 
where: 
d – budget deficit ( % in GDP), 
g -  nominal GDP growth rate, 
b – level of stabilized public debt ( % In GDP) 
  It can be easily noted that if g = 5%, and b = 60% we obtain d = 3%  
(0.03 = 0.05 x 0.6).  The problem, however is, that if g = 6%, then d = 3.6%, etc. 
The very application of his formula is based on a wrong assumption that the 
economic growth rate will equal 5%. Moreover, the formula itself is burdened by the 
generalization error meaning that economic growth is dependent on the growth of 
budget deficit.. At the growth rate g=6% and maintaining the debt at the level of 60% 
of GDP, the budget deficit d =  3.6 %. It is a formula based on the simplified 
Keynesian model. 
 
P. De Grauwe emphasizes that in the 1990s, in the EU countries the average value 
of the public debt share in GDP  may have been at the level of 60% and that was the 
reason why this value was adopted as a reference index.
12 
 
These values were adopted due to the insistence of Germany. They were to prevent 
the situation in which the excessive growth of budget deficits and public debt would 
not lead to an increase in interest rates in the entire Union’s area to the detriment of 
the countries of lower interest rates at the moment the Union was created. Germany 
was among those countries. 
 
The criterion of a long-term interest rate resulted from the conviction that this 
particular rate is the symptom of sustainability of economic results in the sphere of 
price stability in individual countries of the Union. Moreover, reducing differences 
among interest rates allows to avoid arbitration in financial markets, especially in the 
period, when there are many currencies of rigid exchange rate. There was also a 
political reason. Germany was afraid that at a relatively lower interest on their 
treasury bonds in comparison to that in other EU countries, it would have problems 
with placing them in the financial markets.  
 
The criterion of stabilization of the currency exchange rate means stabilization of 
exchange rates in the countries being candidates for the Economic and Monetary 
                                                 
10 On the subject of reasons and motives for introduction of convergence criteria and their economic significance 
see also: L. Oreziak, Euro. Nowy pieniądz, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2003, pp. 35-41. 
11 See: P. De Grauwe, op.cit., pp. 147-148. 
12  Ibidem.   7
Union within the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM-II). The ERM-II was 
established by the decision of the European Council made in Amsterdam on 17 June 
1997.
13 Participation in the ERM-II is voluntary. The exchange rate mechanism is 
based on central exchange rates in relation to the Euro. The fluctuation margin from 
the central exchange rate is +/- 15%.  The national central bank of a country from 
outside the Economic and Monetary Union joining the ERM-II concludes an 
agreement with the European Central Bank which regulates operational procedures 
concerning introduction of central exchange rates. It is also assumed that the country 
does not apply any currency-related restrictions. Stabilization of the given country’s 
exchange rate within the ERM-II in the course of 2 years means that despite the lack 
of currency-related restrictions, the exchange rate is affected by minimum 
fluctuations around the central exchange rate. This proves a possibility of joining the 
single-currency area.  Replacing such currency with single currency only confirms the 
naturally existing state of affairs. 
 
Regardless of the causes which were  behind introduction of the convergence criteria 
in the above described form and specific reference values, it cannot be stated 
unambiguously that they were irrational from the point of view of functioning of the 
created monetary union. It is worth mentioning that they somehow enforced 
economic reforms in the countries aspiring to join the EMU. The said reforms aimed 
at reduced inflation and fiscal stabilization. 
 
Besides, the fiscal stabilization criterion introduced fiscal discipline in individual 
countries. It is commonly known that political objectives are not quite convergent with 
economic ones.  In the post- war period, societies of the European Community (and 
post-communist countries) were accustomed to privileges resulting from social policy 
implemented in conformity with the concept of the welfare state and active 
intervention of the state in economy (subsidizing, protectionism, etc.). The election 
mechanism forced to politicians to retain the traditional social privileges and create 
new ones. This was in contradiction to long-term objectives of macroeconomic 
stabilization and economic growth and development. Introduction of reference values 
pertaining  to budget deficit and public debt and sanctions for exceeding them 
stopped politicians in their plans to distribute the GDP and  to some extent should 
make them think about creating conditions for generating it instead of distributing 
something which has not been generated yet. 
 
3. Convergence criteria versus economic stabilization and economic 
growth 
 
The consequences of convergence criteria for macroeconomic stabilization and 
economic growth should be viewed in the context of both the theory of economics 
and stylized facts. 
 
Fiscal policy, in the broad sense of the word, means application of different 
instruments of the national income redistribution for attainment of fiscal and extra-
fiscal objectives by the states. Fiscal objectives mean ensuring income to the state 
budget and broadly understood public sector and its distribution among different 
spheres of state activities defined by means of its functions in society and economy. 
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On the other hand, extra-fiscal objectives mean using the fiscal policy instruments 
(such as the tax system, programmes of budget expenditures) for regulating the 
behaviour of enterprises and households, equalizing the levels of people’s wealth, 
social objectives accomplishment and economic development between regions, 
regulating economic cycles and changing allocation of resources of factors of 
production across the country.
14 
Fiscal policy can also be discussed in the narrower sense as the policy of regulating 
economic cycles (among others, Keynesian approach). In this case the primary issue 
is using such instruments as taxes and state expenditures (including automatic 
stabilizers of economic cycles, that is programmes of expenditures and progressive 
tax systems with built-in flexibility in relation to changes in GDP) in order to stabilize 
economy and stimulate economic growth.
15 And this narrow concept of fiscal policy 
will be considered in our further discussion. 
 
Fiscal policy must be efficient to be a good instrument of regulating economic 
processes. Unfortunately there are a number of limitations to its efficiency. First of all, 
it is poor flexibility of this policy for information-related, political and social reasons 
which include:
16 
•  the government does not have enough information concerning the course of 
economic growth (information-related limitations) 
•  difficulty in achieving a parliamentary consensus concerning changes in the 
size of the budget deficit and budget structure (operational limitation), 
•  a long period of preparing and discussing tax changes (time limitations), 
•  social barriers in raising taxes or limiting budget expenditures, 
• specificity  of  government  expenditures – it is easier to raise them but more 
difficult to reduce them, 
•  political cycle being in contradiction to rational fiscal policy. 
 
All these reasons may cause that the government’s inability to respond to asymmetric 
shocks in the specified time. Delayed fiscal actions can be inadequate to the 
economic situation in which they are undertaken. 
 
What is more, stabilization effects of fiscal policy are at least dubious, especially in 
the long run. Even if the increase in fiscal expenditures causes GDP growth in a short 
period, the long-term effect of budget deficit and public debt will level off this benefit  
resulting from fiscal intervention. It is worth noting that it will happen in a twofold way. 










                                                 
14 See: S. Bukowski, op. cit., pp. 47-48. 
15  Ibidem. 
16  See also: Mortimer-Lee P., op. cit; S. Bukowski, Teoretyczne podstawy …, op. cit., pp. 61-62. 
17 See more on his topic: U. Kosterna, op. cit., pp. 84-147.   9
Table 1: Short-, medium- and long-term effects and functioning of fiscal policy, tax 




Functioning of the 
mechanism 
Short-term effects  Medium- and long-term effects 








deficit and public 
debt 
1.  Maintaining high budget 
deficit and public debt 
2. Increase in tax burden 
and decrease in 
economic growth and 
welfare 
3.  Increased interest rates 

















1. Increased savings and 
capital accumulation 
2. Increased  investments 
and employment 
3. Accelerated  economic 






5. Increased  budget 
incomes 
6.  Reduced grey economy 
Lowering 
budget deficit 













Temporary drop in 
the rate of economic 
growth 
1. Increased  stabilization 
of economy 
2. Increased tendency for 
work due to reduced 
social protection 
3. Reduced  interest  rates 
4. Increased  private 
investments due to 
limited crowding-out 
effect 
Source: author’s own development 
 
Functioning and short-, medium and long-term effects of fiscal policy, reduced taxes, 
budget deficit and public debt are presented in Table 1. 
 
From the point of view of Keynesian economics limiting possibilities of increasing the 
budget deficit share in GDP above the adopted reference value is essential from the 
point of view of efficient stabilization of economy by means of fiscal policy. 
However, one question must be answered: have the European Union countries 
applied fiscal policy for economic cycle stabilization according to the Keynesian rules 
or not? 
   10
Keynesian economics has eroded for many years (and definitely in the 1970s and 
1980s). The changes in the budget deficit level were not only a pre-meditated action 
to stimulate growth or cool down economy but to a large extent it resulted from 
difficulties with limiting expenditures on political consumption and transfer 
expenditures.
18 The increase in the latter was related to political promises and 
broadening of social privileges (to some extent, the increased social expenditures are 
the result of the deteriorating demographic situation of Western European societies), 
growing share of the so-called “rigid” expenditures (expenditures created by social or 
economic privileges granted to specific branches and sectors of economy, regions 
and confirmed by the law in force). Hence, the problems with growing structural 
deficits emerged (i.e. independent from cyclical fluctuations in economy), which “got 
out of control” and became a serious destabilizing factor and a barrier to economic 




20 criticizes the opinion based on Keynesian economics according to 
which the fiscal policy created at the supranational level is indispensable in the 
monetary union countries to stabilize economy. According to him in the 1980s and 
1990s majority of countries gradually departed from treating fiscal policy as an 
instrument of demand stimulation. It is also like this in the United States. Thus, there 
is no reason to attach too much importance to the role of fiscal policy as an 
instrument of stabilizing economic situation. This function can be successfully 
performed by monetary policy and the market. Besides, it emphasizes a negative 
influence of public debt on economy in the long-run. 
 
The problem of the effect of the price stability criterion on economic growth can be 
summarized in the following question: must economic growth be accompanied by 
high inflation and does the policy of maintaining low inflation pose a barrier to 
economic growth? 
 
As A. Wojtyna puts it: “Economists agree that moderate inflation is better than high 
inflation and low inflation is better than moderate. Moreover, theoretical arguments 
against inflation  are much more convincing than conclusions from empirical studies. 
Although the latter seem to confirm it more and more that low inflation is beneficial for 




High inflation has an adverse effect on processes of economic growth (lower ratee of 
economic growth, the gap between a potential and actual rate of economic growth) in 
the long-run, which consists, among others of the following consequences mentioned 
in literature: 
•  Negative effect of “inflation tax” on real income and savings, uncertainty 
concerning price changes and reduced investment rates in GDP (decline in 
                                                 
18 This is confirmed by investigation results of among others, U. Kosterna, see: U. Kosterna, Deficyt budżetowy 
państwa i jego skutki ekonomiczne, CASE, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa, pp. 34-83. 
19 See more on the topic: W.H. Buster, „Crowding Out” and Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy, “Journal o Public 
Economics”, June 1977; B.D. Bernheim, A Neoclassical Perspective on Budget Deficits, “Journal of Economic 
Perspectives” Vol. 3, No 2 (Spring), 1991; A. Wojtyna, Nowoczesne państwo kapitalistyczne a gospodarka. 
Teoria i praktyka, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1990, pp. 164-195. Kosterna, op. cit., pp. 131-140, 
188-189. 
20  See: Krugman P.R., Currencies and Crises, The MIT Press Cambridge, London, 1999, pp. 201-202. 
21 A. Wojtyna, Szkice o polityce pieniężnej, PWE, Warszawa 2004, p. 41.   11
the share of investments in fixed assets in GDP and substitution between 
investments in fixed assets and short-term financial investments), 
•  Disturbances in financial markets (increased speculation), 
•  Decline in labour productivity 
 
Consequently, the above mentioned factors lead to the low rate of economic 
growth in the long run. 
 
Results of majority of empirical studies point to a negative influence of inflation on 
economic growth in the long run. And thus, R. Barro showed that the relationship 
between inflation and economic growth is of non-linear nature and that inflation has 
an adverse effect on the rate of economic growth in the long run.
22  R. Barro 
investigated relationships between inflation and economic growth basing on 
statistical data from 100 countries for the period 1960-1990. The results of his studies 
reveal that at the inflation rate growth of 10 p.p., the real GDP growth drops by 0.2-
0.3 p.p. annually, and the investment to GDP ratio by 0.4-0.6 p.p.(percentage points). 
The increase of average annual inflation by 10 percentage points causes that in 30 
years’ time the real GDP level is lower by 4-7%.
23 
 
A negative influence of inflation on economic growth is pointed to by results of 
empirical studies of such authors as: J. Andres and I. Hernando, A. Gosh and S. 
Philips, and S. Fisher.
24 
 
Results of empirical studies concerning the relationship between inflation and 
economic growth in OECD countries carried out by J. Andres and I. Fernando reveal 
harmful influence of inflation on economic growth and non-linear relationship 
between inflation and economic growth. They showed also that the inflation rate 
reduced by 1 percentage point could increase production by 0.5- 2.5%.
25 
 
A. Gosh and S. Philips carried out investigations based on 30,603 annual 
observations concerning the real GDP growth per capita and average annual inflation 
concerning 145 countries in the period 1960-1996. The results of their studies reveal 
that there is a positive correlation between low interest rates (2-3%) and the rate of 
economic growth.  These authors indicate that the inflation rate of 2.5% is the 
threshold overstepping of which always causes negative correlation between inflation 
rate and the rate of economic growth..
26 
S. Fisher based his studies on  a dozen or so macroeconomic variables, including 
consumer price index (CPI) in 93 countries. He showed that inflation affects 
economic growth reducing investments and productivity growth rate.
27 
                                                 
22 See: R.J. Barro, Inflation and Economic Growth, NBER Working Paper 5326, 1995; R.J. Barro, Determinants 
of Economic Growth – A Cross-Country Empirical Study, The MIT Press, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
1997. 
23  Ibidem. 
24 See: M. Sarel, Non-Linear Effects of Inflation on Economic Growth, IMF Working Paper No WP/95/56, 1995; 
J. Andres, I. Hernando, Does Inflation Harm Economic Growth? Evidence for the OECD, Banco Espana 
Working Paper 9706, 1997; A. Gosh, S. Philips, Warning: Inflation May Be Harmful to Your Growth, IMF Staff 
Papers Vol. 45, No 4, 1998; S. Fisher, The Role of Macroeconomic Factors in Growth, NBER Working Paper 
No 4565, 1993. 
25 J. Andres, I. Hernando, op. cit. 
26 A. Gosh, S. Philips, op.cit. 
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The quoted research results indicate that a low inflation rate fosters economic growth 
in the long run. However, there are no reasons to claim that maintaining inflation at 
the low level (1-2.5%) is a factor holding up economic growth. 
 
Sustainable high unemployment rate is unlikely to be a result of low inflation rate. If 
we treat the inflation rate as a parameter, then a high unemployment rate in the long-
run is a result of other factors including, among others: labour market overregulation 
and rigid wages, low mobility of labour force (geographically and vocationally), 
excessive fiscalism, extensively developed social policy, etc. 
 
Fiscal stabilization and price stability are prerequisites of relative stability of long-term 
interest rates but also short- and medium term interest rates and their relatively low 
level. It seems that irrespective of the above mentioned premises which stood behind 
introducing the criterion of a long-term interest rate, its implementation fosters the 
long-run macroeconomic stability and economic growth. 
 
As far as the exchange rate criterion is concerned, it refers to the countries joining 
the Economic and Monetary Union . There is a relationship between the exchange 
rate stability within the ERM-II and the remaining convergence criteria and in 
particular the conditions of fiscal stabilization. 
 
It is a criterion which should be implemented when the economy of the country which 
wants to join the Union is relatively stable and the criteria of price stability, fiscal 
stabilization and long-term interest rate are relatively well fulfilled. This “relative 
fulfillment” of the criteria should result from essential structural and institutional 
changes in economy. 
 
Stabilization of the exchange rate of a given country within the framework of ERM-II 
in the course of 2 years means that despite the lack of currency-related restrictions 
the exchange rate undergoes minimal fluctuations around the central exchange rate. 
This proves a possibility of joining a single currency area. Replacing such currency 
with single currency is only a confirmation of the naturally existing state of affairs. 
 
It must be emphasized that the exchange rates of the EU member countries function 
within the framework of a single financial market and consequently at a high mobility 
of capital on the international scale. This entails serious consequences for economic 
policy. As the analysis of the Fleming-Mundell model indicates, at a high mobility of 
capital and in the situation of stable exchange rate, fiscal policy – unlike monetary 
policy -has a positive effect on GDP growth. In this case, expansive monetary policy 
leads to a big outflow of currency reserves. 
 
Price stability (low inflation) and stable exchange rates are a particularly important 
factor determining success of an undertaking being the rigidity of exchange rate in 
relation to the Euro. In order to ensure exchange rate stability, the country’s monetary 
authorities should aim at keeping national inflation fluctuations within a narrow range 
with reference to foreign inflation and  a narrow margin of interest rate fluctuations 
around the parity of interest rates. Otherwise , if the interest rate deflects significantly 
from the average in the European Monetary Union, a strong pressure on currency 
depreciation can occur. This, in turn, may lead to the escape of foreign capital,   13
unbalanced balance of payments and loss of currency reserves. On the other hand, a 
significant upwards deflection of interest rates from the parity will attract short-term 
speculative capital thus acting towards currency appreciation. Convergence of 
exchange rate to the range extremes set by the permitted fluctuation margin is 
dangerous and promotes speculative attacks. Besides, it requires costly currency-
related interventions. 
 
The level of prices in the economy of a country of a relatively low economic 
development which is planning to join the European Monetary Union is determined, 
among others, by two basic factors. They are: Samuelson-Balassy
28 effect and pro-
inflation influence of budget deficit. These factors affect also the increase in interest 
rates. 
 
The pro-inflation effect of the Samuelson-Balassa effect is revealed first of all by 
economies which based their economic growth on liberalization of their foreign trade 
(among others, the case of new EU members). In the economies of this type 
productivity grows in the sector of exchangeable goods thus leading to higher wages. 
Due to imitation (here by pressure from the Trade Unions) the growth in wages is 
transferred to the sector of non-exchangeable goods where the rate of growth starts 
to exceed the growth in labour productivity. As a result, internal demand grows and 
consequently, prices rise. In the long run productivity growth leads also to the 
national currency appreciation. 
 
Budget deficit and public debt which result from it  influence the price level as well as 
the level of interest rates. Increased budget deficit stimulates inflation expectations. 
Moreover, the open market operations accomplished in order to stabilize the 
exchange rate can influence the increase in the monetary base when the central 
bank buys bonds and treasury bonds in order to counteract excessive currency 
appreciation. 
 
Budget deficit and public debt affect the growth of interest rates. This, in turn, affects 
the growth of pressure on currency appreciation pushing the exchange rate towards 
the lowest border of the permitted fluctuation margin. It is worth mentioning that 
public debt is related to the issue of securities which are an attractive investment 
instrument for banks. By means of the portfolio crowding-out effect it leads to the 
maintenance of high interest rates on bank credits and a large spread between the 
interest rate on credits and the interest rate on bank deposits. Nevertheless, the 
interest rates on deposits and interest rates on securities are usually above the 
interest rates abroad. High interest rates in the country in relation to the foreign 
interest rates and attractiveness of securities for foreign investors  attract mainly 
short-term capital 
 
Budget deficit is usually accompanied by the deficit in current account. Maintaining 
high budget deficit and a deficit in current account are negative signals for foreign 
investors and it is quite likely that they will withdraw their capital from a given country. 
This increases the risk of a currency crisis. 
 
                                                 
28  See: B. Balassa, The Purchasing Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal, „Journal of Political Economy”, Vol 
72, 1964; P. Samuelson, Theoretical Notes on Trade Problems, “Review of Economics and Statistics”, Vol 46, 
1964.   14
Therefore, it is crucial for the country joining the ERM-II to have a stable situation in 
the sphere of public finance. The ERM-II accession must be preceded by a deep 
reform of public finances aiming at suppressing the growth in budget deficit and 
public debt, and then bringing budget deficit and public debt to a low level measured 
by their share in the GDP. Taking into account the convergence criteria, they should 
be met prior to entering the ERM-II.  Otherwise, the exchange rate will fluctuate 
dangerously and the risk of failure for the whole undertaking will grow. It must be 
emphasized that it is not the nominal convergence criteria which must be satisfied. 
Meeting the nominal convergence criteria must result from the real convergence 
processes. The reform and restructuring of the economy of the country which plans 
the ERM-II accession should rely, among others, on  deregulating moves. It means 
creating the conditions for flexible functioning of markets, including labour market. 
Because in the situation of a rigid exchange rate (rigid in relation to the Euro) and 
large mobility of capital the possibilities of employing the economic policy are more 
limited than in the situation of liquid exchange rates (or even stable ones but with a 
possibility of devaluation and re-valuation), then the main burden of adjustment in a 
two-year period of stabilization and later, when the national currency has been 
replaced by the Euro,  will rely on the mechanism of flexible markets. It is of particular 
importance in the case of economic shocks of demand- or supply-side nature which 
may occur in the period of stabilizing the exchange rate. 
 
An important issue is also the level of the national currency exchange rate at the 
moment of making it rigid in relation to the Euro with reference to the long-term 
balance of the balance of payments. If the exchange rate of the national currency is 
overvalued in relation to the Euro, this means that the balance in the current account 
is deteriorating, export competitiveness is reduced and reserves flow out of the 
country. The lower competitiveness of exports and negative balance in the current 
account may be maintained for a longer period of time and entail recession in the 
economy. The example of the former German Democratic Republic is worth 
remembering here where within the framework of the Union with the German Federal 
Republic the basic conversion rate of East German mark into West German one was 
at the level of 1:1.  This meant the East German mark was appreciated in relation to 
the West German mark by ca. 450%. This move resulted in the slump in exports from 






Convergence criteria are, to some extent,  a consequence of adopting theories of 
optimum currency areas and cost and benefit analysis of creating a single-currency 
area as the foundation of the monetary union of the European Community. 
 
Fulfillment of convergence criteria should be of durable character and this requires a 
certain degree of real convergence among the monetary union countries. 
 
The analysis of  the significance of convergence criteria which has been carried out 
in this paper indicates that despite numerous extra-economic premises for adopting 
them in the Maastricht Treaty, their implementation is an important factor enforcing 
                                                 
29 See: S. Bukowski, op. cit., p. 73.   15
macroeconomic stabilization in the EMU countries and the countries which aspire to 
the EMU accession. 
 
From the point of view of the theory of economics as well as from the point of view of 
empirical studies it cannot be declared unambiguously  that the convergence criteria 
pose a barrier to economic growth. This matter is controversial, yet it may be 
concluded that implementation of these criteria by the EMU member countries and 
the countries which are waiting for joining the Union is an important factor of the long-
run macroeconomic stabilization and balanced economic growth in the EU. Naturally, 
are other factors apart from this one. 
 
Low economic growth rate and relatively high unemployment in the EU countries 
result, first of all, from such factors as: overregulating of economies (including labour 
market), rigid wages and prices, excessively developed social policy, high taxation 
burden for population and enterprises, too big budgets which should be reduced 
while reducing taxes and expenditures at the same time. Therefore, economic 
reforms aiming at creating institutional and structural conditions for efficient 
functioning of market mechanisms are indispensable. These reforms should aim at 
increased flexibility of markets, prices and wages, lower taxation and reduced role of 
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